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the slanderer? Who is the one who is trying to cover up deeds like this?"

As long as these things happen, and as long as we hear about it, it will be our responsibility to testify against the evil that is gripping this country. We will not refuse. We will not stop doing this.

We will refuse to be intimidated. It seems to me that the South African government thinks that these things that happen, these atrocities—yes, atrocities, Mr. Minister—will stop us from demanding our freedom. But the South African government must learn that the time that they can avert a change—a fundamental change in South Africa—by merely reaching for a gun is over. We will no longer be silenced by fear, or by intimidation, or even by the wanton killing of our people.

The demands are there and are clear: release the political prisoners; unban the organizations; scrap all these laws that have made South Africa a hell for so many people to live in; stop killing our children and our people on the street. Let us participate in an open, democratic society. Then there will be peace in this country.

The state threatens to ban the organizations, and they threaten to ban the United Democratic Front. It will be a little difficult because, I have often said, the UDF is the people of South Africa. They cannot ban the people. The UDF embodies the dreams of the people of South Africa, and they cannot ban that dream. The UDF embodies the aspiration of the people toward a free and just society. They cannot ban that.

They can do whatever they want; but the determination of our people to be free will remain and will become the real reality that even Mr. Le Grange and his government will have to face. So it seems to me that all of the threats that we see will not really, in the end, help the South African government.

There are threats against individuals. I do not know what the minister has in mind for me. I have just heard that I will be charged, and over the last week the threats have come in more frequently than before.

Someone has called me up and said that the system has many ways to get at you. And they will do that. I do not know what means. I do not understand. But it does not matter now. That is no longer the most important thing in my life.

The most important thing is what I want to remember tonight: what we are fighting for, what we are struggling for, what our people are suffering for, what our people are dying for. That is worthwhile. Let us not give that up.

Let us remember that no threats and no form of intimidation and no trick that the system can play on any one of us, including myself, can bring us to the point where we will be silent, where we will accept the situation as it is. Because if we do that, we might as well give up and die.

We sometimes die a thousand times before we die. Because when we are afraid, we die every day a little bit. We die in our humanity, and we die in our determination, and we die in our self-respect. Let us not come to that point.

For me it is clear. I have experienced in this last year something within the community of the UDF that will remain with me as long as I live. I have experienced support, and I have experienced a determination, and I have experienced a love for freedom that is a precious gift that we have. We must not give that up. This is what we have to continue to work for.

I have seen a new South Africa. I have seen a land, not of apartheid, not of death, not of chains, but a land of joy and a land of freedom and a land of peace. Let us fight

for that land. I have seen a new land where our children will no longer be bound down by the yoke of racism. Let us fight for that land. I have seen a land where our people shall work and enjoy the fruits of their labor. Let us fight for that land.

I have seen a land where families will no longer be broken up, and where mothers and fathers will enjoy the love and the respect of their children. Let us fight for that land. I have seen a land where the misery of relocation is no more, and where the graves dug for little children who will tomorrow die of hunger remain empty. Let us fight for that land.

I have seen a land where those of us who fight for freedom and for justice and for the self-respect of this country will no longer be sent to prison, will no longer be tortured, will no longer be threatened, will no longer be shot on the streets of our nation, but will be rewarded with honor and with the presence of justice. Let us fight for that land. And I have seen a land where we together will build something that is worthwhile, that is faithful to what we believe.

Let us not give that up, but make tonight a new dedication for that moment. Because I believe it does not matter what happens now. I believe that the freedom that we have struggled for and the freedom that we have died for will become a reality. You can make it happen. God bless you. ●

that a critical factor in their ability to continue with a reign of terror in Afghanistan is the degree to which public opinion is aware—or unaware—of the atrocities being committed there by Soviet troops. In this the Soviets have been quite successful: The Soviet press, as we know, is all but a joke; meanwhile, journalists from the international press have been warned that they will be shot on sight if found in Afghanistan. Deprived of film footage, the resistance in Afghanistan has been all but ignored of late by the electronic media.

On another level, the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan differs from our own campaign in Southeast Asia in the timeframe envisioned before victory is achieved. Whereas we are unaccustomed to prolonged military involvements and tend to judge engagements in terms of a "quick victory," the Russians take a long-range view of history, assessing their involvement in Afghanistan in terms of 20, 30, 40, even 50 years. "Time changes everything," one official noted, "in another 10 or 20 years, the new generation of Afghans will view our presence differently."

Mr. President, the goal of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan is not pacification, nor merely subjugation; it is, to quote Ambassador Kirkpatrick, "the complete transformation of Afghan society and politics," and to that end, "they have already made substantial progress." On the one hand, the Soviets have resorted to a military strategy which the scholar Louis Dupree has termed "migratory genocide" and "rubbleization"—essentially the depopulation of Afghanistan through mass murder and the forced exodus of over one-quarter of the Afghan people to Pakistan and Iran.

On the other hand, the Soviets have embarked on a long-term program to develop a cadre of loyal quislings among the next generation of Afghans. The Soviet strategy here is to destroy the schools in Afghanistan and to remove the youth, 8- and 9-year-olds, to the Soviet Union for a Marxist "education." When these properly educated Afghan youngsters come of age, they will be capable of staffing such positions in Afghanistan as the Soviets find it convenient or necessary to fill with indigenous help. Indeed, in a country where the educational infrastructure will have been decimated, these Soviet-trained quislings will be the only Afghans capable of overseeing the population.

Mr. President, it is for this reason that, when confronted with the Soviets' strategy of victory through the long-range transformation of Afghan society, we must consider the many different ways in which assistance may be rendered to the Afghan people. The Wall Street Journal of March 15 contained a very informative piece by Susan Garment on the efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy in Afghanistan. Entitled

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"Fighting Culture Wars in Afghanistan," the article details the work which this relatively young organization has undertaken in the preservation of democratic ideas and principles around the world. In Afghanistan, funds from the National Endowment for Democracy have been used to write and distribute textbooks, train teachers and open schools in areas controlled by the freedom fighters. This educational assistance is particularly important if the next generation of Afghans is to ward off the tyranny of Soviet-educated administrators and overseers. Additionally, the endowment has supplied the freedom fighters with portable video cameras, so that the reality of Soviet terror in Afghanistan can be recorded and displayed before the world.

Food, medicine, and the wherewithal to defend themselves are all necessary components of a comprehensive program of assistance to the Afghan people. The maintenance of an indigenous educational community is equally important and deserves our attention.

Mr. President, I ask that Ms. Garment's article be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

## FIGHTING CULTURE WARS IN AFGHANISTAN

(By Susanne Garment)

There is nothing like the thought of hanging to concentrate the mind, and nothing like a crisis to show what an organization is or is not good for. This week the National Endowment for Democracy, a private but government-funded group recently established to support the growth of democracy throughout the world, went before a House subcommittee for its annual appropriations hearing. Star of the occasion was Republican Rep. Hank Brown of Colorado, who accused the Endowment of wasting taxpayers' money on things the rest of the U.S. government was already doing. Clearly, Rep. Brown was not taking his bearings from the question of how to improve American performance in a crisis of democracy like the current Soviet war against Afghanistan.

In the good old post-World War II days, the U.S. gave a certain amount of covert aid to political and cultural institutions that promoted democratic, American-style ideas in various countries. During the Vietnam War, the belief spread among our opinion leaders that we should not stick our self-interested noses into other nations' sacredly indigenous affairs in this way. The official U.S. aid shriveled, and few private American organizations were willing or able to fill the breach.

But not everyone in American politics looked upon this purification as a good thing. Thus it came to pass that Ronald Reagan, in a 1982 speech to the British Parliament, proposed a new unit to take up the job of watching out for the health of democratic ideas. The speech turned into an organization that was finally declared official by Congress in November 1983.

At the beginning the project looked like a sure loser. It couldn't be secret anymore, of course. The projects the Endowment dealt with would be initiated and carried out by private organizations, so the government would not dirty its hands with operational details. The board would give voice to the whole howling range of American politics—business and labor. Republicans and Demo-

crats, hawks and doves. Surely the organization's policies would emerge as pious platitudes, proclaiming impartial disgust with hostile dictators on the left and friendly dictators on the right.

It is something of a miracle that Endowment President Carl Gershman was able to keep this bunch on speaking terms long enough to spend any of that money Rep. Brown is so worried about. The labor movement is the biggest single force in the Endowment so far, because at the beginning only labor had pre-existing organizations already engaged in the sort of work that the fledgling Endowment wanted to support. Therefore, others on the board, Democrats at least as much as Republicans, were always looking to take a whack at the unions. The Democratic Party has been tussling over which ideas and people should henceforth control it, so people from the various Democratic factions have made trouble for one another. *Realpolitik* fans have not been able to see why we truly need a democratic think tank in Guatemala, while a certain sort of idealist has recommended projects like U.S. Soviet youth leadership exchanges as the route to democratic nirvana.

Puzzlingly, though, the Endowment has not only survived but has given support to a pretty consistently good list of projects. Money has gone to help plan an international youth conference in Jamaica, to strengthen democratically based cooperatives in Chile, to help support the independent newspaper "La Prensa" in Nicaragua. And, of course, there has been money for Afghanistan.

Consider the Endowment's most recent effort in the face of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Over the last few weeks expert witnesses have been testifying on the current situation to the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan. From them we get a consistent idea of what the Afghans need now. They need effective arms. They need food in the face of the Soviets' deliberate destruction of agriculture. They say they also urgently need education, both within the country and outside it. This request would not naturally go to the top of a U.S. policy maker's list. But the Afghans know that the Soviets aim to pacify the country in the long run by such devices as destroying the schools and taking the young children away for Marxist education in the Soviet Union. Such tactics may not bear fruit next month but could destroy the culture of Afghan independence in the generation to come.

The Endowment has just awarded an education grant to American Friends of Afghanistan. The money will go to writing, reprinting, and distributing textbooks in areas controlled by freedom fighters; to training Afghan teachers and sending them home to reopen schools, and to give Afghans portable video cameras—plus training—so they can bear witness to the invasion's impact. Yes, this is a small effort compared with a nice bunch of missile launchers. But there is no doubt that the state of the spirit inside Afghanistan and the state of opinion abroad can be changed so as to affect Soviet calculations of what this war is worth to them. Two days ago the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva issued its strongest resolution yet on Afghanistan, condemning Soviet torture, bombing of civilians and destruction of agriculture. The vote followed a report last week from within the U.N. bureaucracy accusing the Soviets of torture and chemical warfare. Such U.N. actions would have been unthinkable a decade ago. The small new Endowment is already beginning to give us a few bangs for our bucks. Would that more publicly funded

agencies could give such a clearly satirical account of themselves.

## IMPORTATION OF FISHING TACKLE

- Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, one industry affected by U.S. concessions to our trading partners is the fishing tackle industry.

While duties on fishing tackle imported to the United States have been reduced, thousands of American jobs have been lost to offshore production. Today, most fishing tackle is produced abroad, where the standard of living is much lower and Government subsidies are available. The result is that in 1980, imports of fishing rods were valued at almost \$27 million. In 1984, imports had risen to over \$60 million—an increase of 124 percent in just 4 years.

One of the few surviving U.S. manufacturers is the Shakespeare Co., which accounts for 800 jobs in my home State of South Carolina. In order to compete with foreign manufacturers, Shakespeare has had to invest in research and development to improve their fishing rods. They have also invested in equipment to modernize their manufacturing and to implement their innovative designs.

Further, in order to convince the American consumer to buy American products, Shakespeare is offering a \$50 U.S. savings bond with the purchase of its newest line of fishing rods, called the Liberty fishing rod. With the sale of each of these innovative rods, Shakespeare is making a donation to restore the Statue of Liberty. I commend the Shakespeare Co. for the efforts it has made and continues to make to compete with foreign manufacturers.

Like many other industries in America, this one is modern and fully capable of competing. The problem is that our Government is not competing. While other nations mobilize for the global economic contest, we sit up in the stands caterwauling about "free trade, free trade, protectionism, protectionism," as if those words had any relevance to the present economic competition. Unless our Government wakes up and gets in the game with a trade policy demanding reciprocity from our trading partners, this Nation will go the way of England. And the commendable efforts of all our companies to prepare for the competition will count for naught because of a government which refuses to enforce our trade laws and refuses to join the fray. Let us wake up before it is too late.●

## PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR EXCHANGES

- Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the president of the American Society for Public Administration, Mr. Bradley Peterson, has written forcefully on the need for the United States and the Soviet Union to adopt measures de-

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ments. I pledge to serve my country now and to prepare myself for the future. Although, as a student, I do not vote or pay taxes, I can still support my country through my present actions. I can exercise my constitutional rights by keeping informed about important issues and voicing my opinions by letter or petition to my government representatives. In addition, I can provide important volunteer service for my community. Through service clubs, I have worked for the Salvation Army, Special Olympics, and a school for autistic children. By serving the people of America, I am serving America herself. Working for my country now is extremely important; but, as nationally acclaimed inventor Charles Kettering once said, "We should all be concerned about the future because we will have to spend the rest of our lives there." For my generation, preparing for the future is critical, because soon America's future will rest in our hands. We must educate ourselves about our government and our future responsibilities as tax-paying, voting citizens. As an individual, I also must realize my potential so I can make a significant contribution to my country's welfare.

Finally, I pledge myself to make a strong commitment to America. If I do not take my pledge seriously, then it is worthless. Words are easy to write and even easier to say, but acting upon those words is much harder. I cannot pledge myself to America and then put off my service and education until later or completely forget about them. If I do, then I am guilty of apathy, perhaps the greatest threat to democratic America.

Instead of indifference, I want to give my country action. Therefore, I pledge myself to uphold America's traditions, to work during the present and for the future, and to commit myself to fulfilling this solemn promise. My pledge can make a difference in my goals and actions and possibly the goals and actions of others as well. After all, in the words of Henry Emerson Fosdick, "Democracy is based upon the conviction that there are extraordinary possibilities in ordinary people". I intend to unlock some of my extraordinary potential by giving and living my pledge to America. ●

#### SUPPORT FOR THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN CAMBODIA

● Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, once again war is raging in Cambodia, forcing nearly a quarter million Cambodian civilians to flee their homeland and take refuge in Thailand. During the past few months Vietnam, which has occupied Cambodia since 1979 with an army of approximately 170,000 troops, has attacked and overrun Cambodian resistance camps near Cambodia's border with Thailand. The Vietnamese first attacked the camps of the nationalist Khmer People's National Liberation Front of former Prime Minister Son Sann, then those of the Communist Khmer Rouge, and they have now besieged the stronghold of a smaller group loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Most of the resistance forces, as well as the civilian population under their control, have taken refuge in Thailand.

The renewed fighting and the depopulation of Cambodia by the Vietnamese occupation army has aroused little outrage or even concern here in the United States. The bitter memory

of our tragic military involvement in Indochina has made many Americans want to forget about that area and to distance ourselves from its current problems. Moreover, the situation in Cambodia is complicated by the fact that one part of the Cambodian resistance is led by the notorious Khmer Rouge Communists, who carried out massive atrocities against the Cambodian people under the Pol Pot government.

Nevertheless, we should not forget that there is another alternative to the Vietnamese-dominated Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh and the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge. The non-Communist KPNLF has demonstrated an ability to win the support of the Cambodian population in the areas that it controls. Moreover, its guerrilla forces have been growing in number while those of the Khmer Rouge have been declining, despite the much greater material support which the KR has received from China. Although its camps in Cambodia have been overrun by the Vietnamese, the KPNLF guerrilla army was able to escape with its weapons and to regroup in Thailand.

As in Afghanistan, the Cambodian people are the victims of a foreign Communist aggressor which is ruthlessly trying to subjugate and depopulate their country to further its own strategic goals. No less than the Afghan freedom fighters, the KPNLF deserves our moral, political, and material support. We must not forget them.

I request that three articles describing the recent fighting in Cambodia be inserted in the RECORD. The first by Elizabeth Becker on the non-Communist resistance was published in the Washington Post on January 13. The second by William Shawcross appeared in the Los Angeles Times on January 20. And the third is a March 6 Washington Post report by William Branigin on the Vietnamese attack against the last remaining resistance camp inside Cambodia.

I also request that the December 1984 preliminary report of the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights on "Human Rights in Kampuchea" be inserted in the RECORD.

The material follows:

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1985]

#### CAMBODIA'S NON-COMMUNISTS FIGHT BACK

(By Elizabeth Becker)

Indochina got back on the front page last week, thanks to a particularly bloody Vietnamese attack against a Cambodian encampment near the Thai border. This story is no longer compelling to Americans, who—humiliated by defeat—left the region a decade ago. But the fighting goes on, and—irony of ironies—it has taken a turn in Cambodia that Americans only dreamt of during the years of their involvement.

It wasn't just any Cambodians the Vietnamese attacked so brutally. It was the camp of a group called the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, which, despite a name that evokes the Vietcong, is a nation-

alist, non-communist faction of apparently increasing strength and popularity. They are one of the two principal armies fighting Vietnam's six-year occupation of Cambodia. The other belongs to the Khmer Rouge. All last year the Vietnamese said the chief obstacle to their joining in peace talks was the continued presence of the murderous Khmer Rouge. But recent events demonstrate that Vietnam is not interested in peace negotiations and that its greatest political concern is not the Khmer Rouge but this nationalistic alternative to all forms of Indochinese communism.

The KPNLF has become the "third force"—neither communist nor corrupt—that Americans searched for during all the years of their involvement in Indochina. Graham Greene's Quiet American died for the third force. Until the end in 1975 some American officials dreamt of its emergence to save the region, and particularly Vietnam, from communism. Now, without any military support from Washington, the KPNLF has arisen to play that role in Cambodia.

That the KPNLF has become a crucial target for Hanoi's forces is beyond question. Since they opened fire on Cambodian resistance camps in late December, the Vietnamese have virtually ignored the militarily superior Khmer Rouge in order to shell and burn the military camps and civilian villages of the KPNLF.

The KPNLF army is barely two-thirds the size of the Khmer Rouge armed forces; it is ill-equipped; it has no major foreign power backing to insure its survival above all other Cambodian factions.

In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the KPNLF have nonetheless proven themselves in the past two or three years to be the greatest political threat to Vietnamese plans to entrench its client state in Phnom Penh. Something akin to a role reversal has occurred in this third Indochina war being fought in Western Cambodia.

Whereas in the first and second Indochina wars communist guerrillas captured the mantle of independence against foreign occupation and won admiration for persevering in spite of all odds, the small KPNLF is beginning to win a similar reputation in Cambodia.

If the current war was strictly between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese imposed regime of Heng Samrin, the odds would be far better for Hanoi. It would then be a simple contest between two warring wings of the same Cambodian communist party. The people of Cambodia would have the narrow choice between Pol Pot's brand of Khmer communism, which led to the death of well over one million Cambodians, or the Vietnamese-style communism now administered through the Heng Samrin regime that makes Cambodia a near-colony of Vietnam.

But Son Sann, the leader of the KPNLF, refused to leave Cambodians such limited choices. A former prime minister of Cambodia in the '60s, Son Sann organized the KPNLF around a platform espousing democratic ideals, a free, independent, nonaligned Cambodia and a sense of nationalism tied to Buddhism. Unable to get support from non-communist powers, the KPNLF has had to rely on the Chinese. Peking gives the lion's share of its military assistance to its long-time ally the Khmer Rouge and gives the leftovers to the KPNLF.

Perhaps because of this abandonment the KPNLF has surprised all sides and made deep inroads in occupied Cambodia, becoming, in many respects, the Cambodian faction the others have to discredit. Although it is small comfort, the punishing, brutal Vietnamese attacks against their camps over

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the past month are a tribute to the success the KPNLF has had undermining the Vietnamese occupation.

There is proof plenty that the KPNLF rather than the Khmer Rouge are the chief political opponents at the moment of the Vietnamese occupiers and their Cambodian client—the Heng Samrin government.

The jails of the Samrin regime are filled with KPNLF followers, or people suspected of supporting the KPNLF, not with Khmer Rouge. On the contrary, the Samrin regime has shown extraordinary leniency towards the Khmer Rouge to whom they offered a clemency program requiring no more than one month's re-education before they are welcomed back into the fold. They are seen as wayward communists who need only be shown "the true path", as the Minister of Justice said, before becoming citizens with full rights in the Samrin regime.

The KPNLF, on the other hand, represent an entirely antagonistic political alternative. Over a year ago, the Vietnamese stepped in to eliminate suspected KPNLF followers in the northwest and countermanded the orders of the representative of the supposedly independent Samrin regime.

When the Vietnamese or the Heng Samrin regime are criticizing the KPNLF they say that there is nearly no difference between the KPNLF and Pol Pot's people. The Vietnamese are capitalizing on the KPNLF's entering into a loose coalition for more than two years with the Khmer Rouge and the tiny forces led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. They were pushed into the coalition in a politically pragmatic move urged on them by foreign powers—China, Thailand and the U.S.

Everyone has changed sides so often in the continuing war for Cambodia it is easy to get lost in the thicket. Only one leader—Son Sann—has refused to completely change sides and join the enemy. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the most famous of Cambodians, has changed sides so many times he has come to represent little more than himself and a vague Khmer nationalism. He fought against the Khmer Rouge when he was leader of Cambodia but when he was deposed in 1970 he went over to the Khmer Rouge side and used his considerable reputation to encourage Cambodians to come with him.

The Khmer Rouge rewarded him by putting Sihanouk under virtual house arrest after they came to power and announced their own government. Yet today, Sihanouk is far closer to his Khmer Rouge associates in the coalition than to Son Sann, whom he openly distrusts.

The Heng Samrin regime is led by and filled with Khmer Rouge who fought under Pol Pot and helped run his horrible regime. They joined with the Vietnamese when it was clear that they were next in line in Pol Pot's execution lists.

It is within this muddy, bloody context that Son Sann stands out even further. During the civil war, from 1970 to 1975, Son Sann refused to support either the criminally corrupt and inept regime of Lon Nol's Khmer Republic or its enemy, the communist front of the Khmer Rouge nominally headed by Sihanouk. As a result, Son Sann was threatened with arrest by Lon Nol, snubbed by the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh and threatened with death by Sihanouk in Peking.

A man of the 'third force' with no side to support, Son Sann returned to Paris and the life of an obscure exile whose mind is fixed on events in his homeland. When the Vietnamese were looking around for a candidate to head a puppet regime should they overthrow Pol Pot, they sent an intermediary to Son Sann to ask if he would join them. Son

Sann said no, largely that two wrongs would not make a right and that he was opposed to any plans for a Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia even if it would mean the end of the monstrous Pol Pot regime.

When the Vietnamese succeeded, Son Sann moved from Paris to a base on the Thai-Cambodian border and set about transforming a tired band of refugees, newly arrived overseas Cambodians and young recruits into a military and political resistance force.

Through painstaking effort the KPNLF's army and political staff grew despite enemies on all sides. When Son Sann's army started in 1979 it had some 1,000 members. The Khmer Rouge, under Pol Pot, had nearly 80,000 soldiers. The Vietnamese occupation force numbered 200,000.

Yet today the numbers are revealing. Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, despite the vastly superior aid, number around 35,000 soldiers while Son Sann's KPNLF is thought to be between 15,000 and 20,000 soldiers.

Their appeal and propaganda reach deep inside Cambodia and into the government. KPNLF operatives have their own impressive intelligence network. When Cambodians defect from the Heng Samrin regime, defected that the Vietnamese are still in control of the country, they join the KPNLF forces if they decide to remain involved in their country's war.

The KPNLF is overshadowed, however, by the chimera of the Third Force of Vietnam, by the extraordinary fame of Sihanouk and the battlefield reputation of the Khmer Rouge. Son Sann, a former financier who is supremely self-confident and patient, is, however, uncharacteristically modest and shy for the leader of a guerrilla movement.

Son Sann's unlikely demeanor and his age of 73 years undoubtedly contributed to the early and consistent American position to refuse granting military aid to the KPNLF. Son Sann expected the opposite. But the U.S. would have no part in his military plans. The Carter administration decided to give its tacit support to the rearming and regrouping of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot. They saw no future for the KPNLF. The Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, were proven military leaders, fighters who could go head to head with the Vietnamese. Both armies benefitted from American aid to refugees along the border.

The Reagan administration continued the Carter policy although it has given greater political support to the KPNLF as it has grown in strength and influence. It was under the Reagan administration that China, the U.S., and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) put irresistible pressure on Son Sann to join in a coalition with Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. Son Sann believes he was promised military support from the U.S. in return for joining this unholy alliance but that support never came.

But the U.S. has abdicated its military interest in the Indochina region to China. The Chinese are responsible not only for nearly all the armaments sent to the Cambodian factions fighting the Vietnamese but Peking is also the major guarantor of direct military assistance should Thailand be attacked by Vietnam in the midst of the current war.

Moreover, it appears that the lesson the U.S. believes it has learned from the last Vietnam War is that in Indochina communists are better fighters than non-communists. The Pentagon has repeatedly fought against any American military assistance to another 'third force' in Indochina, particularly not to the KPNLF.

Although that decision went against Son Sann's wishes, the results may have been to the benefit rather than the detriment of

the KPNLF. If history is any judge, the KPNLF has done far better without U.S. military assistance than those resistance groups who received American aid. One need only remember the Kurds, the anti-Castro Cubans and the rebels in Angola who received direct or indirect American aid so long as an American enemy could be bled by their forces but lost that aid when Washington found their resistance inconvenient.

Some of the Cambodians in the non-communist resistance are keenly aware of the high price of American military assistance. They are veterans of the corrupt Lon Nol regime which from 1970 until its defeat in 1975, was underwritten by the U.S. Up until the last weeks the U.S. gave uncritical support to Lon Nol despite all evidence that he was losing the war through corruption and neglect as surely as the Khmer Rouge were winning it.

For all of these reasons American military assistance to the KPNLF is not the automatic answer some have put forth. The KPNLF has emerged as the most independent Cambodian force fighting in what could be seen as a three-cornered war for Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge are discredited not only for their murderous regime but for their long-standing allegiance to and dependence on China. The Vietnamese call them a puppet of China and the Cambodian people see a germ of truth in the charge. Of course the Heng Samrin regime is regularly called a puppet of Hanoi, a charge that also sticks.

The KPNLF, the orphans of the war, cannot be portrayed as any country's client. True, the resistance does depend on the expensive goodwill of Thailand for a safehaven and dependable supply route; and without Chinese military supplies it would have languished with little chance to prove its military ability. Moreover, by joining in the loose coalition with Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, the KPNLF has tainted its reputation. But compared to the other groups fighting in the war, the KPNLF can hardly be accused as acting as a stand-in for a major foreign power.

Son Sann is adamant that he is not interested in massive military aid, nothing that even vaguely resembles the scale of aid given the old Lon Nol regime. He is equally uninterested in the American interference that went along with the aid. Rather, he has a modest shopping list of equipment he wants shipped to his troops—nothing more or less.

It is questionable whether the U.S. is capable much less willing to give even limited supplies without demanding a price that would diminish the appeal of the KPNLF.

As of this week, the question is of utmost importance. The Vietnamese have destroyed all of the major KPNLF camps including their headquarters at Ampil. Moreover the Vietnamese have changed tactics. Besides destroying camps, they have stationed themselves in what appear to be permanent bases smack up against the border to prevent the KPNLF from returning to Cambodia. The Vietnamese apparently want to cut off the KPNLF from their routes inside Cambodia—routes they have used successfully to harass Vietnamese troops, organize their followers around the country, gain new recruits and circulate propaganda against the Vietnamese occupation.

Those KPNLF activities have proved too effective against the Vietnamese occupiers. They hope to stamp out the non-communist resistance and leave the Cambodians with the choice of either the Khmer Rouge or their Heng Samrin regime.

The next stage is crucial. Have the non-communists suffered a military defeat that

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will leave them incapable of regrouping and expanding? How should the U.S. and other sympathetic powers respond without jeopardizing the KPNLF? Is the KPNLF the last gasp of the dream of a third force or has it emerged as the powerfully attractive independence fighters that somehow survive foreign occupiers as other Indochinese guerrillas before them, including those who fought with Ho Chi Minh?

[From the Los Angeles Times, Jan. 20, 1985]

**WAR, DISRUPTION, DEATH: CAMBODIA'S ENDLESS AGONY**

(By William Shawcross)

LONDON.—Along the Thai-Cambodian border right now, close to 200,000 people are huddling from the sun by a tank ditch, their only shelter blue strips of plastic draped over sticks, their only food and water provided, like the plastic, by the United Nations every day. Their only expectation, more war, more disruption, more death.

They are Cambodian refugees, the latest Cambodian victims of two refusals. Vietnam's refusal to accept any compromise in its attempts to dominate all of Cambodia and the refusal of China, Thailand and their allies to let Vietnam get away unharassed with the sad little country that Cambodia has so long been and so long probably will be.

In April, Vietnam will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of its victory over the United States. Scores of U.S. reporters and TV crews have been invited. But the Vietnamese are unlikely to allow them to witness its failure to achieve a similar victory in neighboring Cambodia, where its five-year effort to suppress all opposition climaxed in recent weeks with massive attacks on the camps of the main non-communist resistance group, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, or KPNLF, along the Thai border. These dry season attacks have become annual events, but this year the assault has been especially virulent.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978 to overthrow its former allies, the Khmer Rouge. Their leader, Pol Pot, had ruled Cambodia with appalling brutality since April, 1975. More than 1 million of Cambodia's 7 million people are thought to have died under their rule. The Khmer Rouge also continually attacked Vietnamese positions and villages over the country's mutual, long-disputed border. It was this, not the abuse of human rights within Cambodia, which persuaded the Vietnamese to invade.

After the Vietnamese army drove the Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh, Vietnam installed a puppet government. This regime, headed by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge officer, is still in power, sustained by between 160,000 and 200,000 Vietnamese troops. But although Hanoi and its new ally control most of Cambodian countryside and population, the resistance to them appears to be growing.

This is because for many Cambodians liberation from the Khmer Rouge in 1979 has now become occupied by the Vietnamese. The Heng Samrin regime is far less brutal than the Khmer Rouge, which attempted to return Cambodia to what it called Year Zero, turning the country into a vast agricultural gulag.

Nonetheless, the Heng Samrin government is Marxist-Leninist and has become increasingly dogmatic since 1979. And real power is in the hands of the Vietnamese, who have advisers in every ministry and every provincial administration.

Now there are three resistance groups based close to or along the Thai border: the Khmer Rouge, the KPNLF and a group led

by Cambodia's former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. They are linked in a loose coalition government led by Sihanouk. It is this government, not that of Heng Samrin, that is recognized by the United Nations. All three groups exist because supplies are brought through Thailand, which has protested most strongly the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. Thailand has always seen Cambodia as a buffer between it and Vietnam.

But the Khmer Rouge, with 35,000 troops, have a problem of recruitment. They are still widely feared. The KPNLF, by contrast, has no record of brutality. As a non-communist group, it attracts Cambodians disillusioned with both the Cambodian and the Vietnamese versions of communism.

The third group, also non-communist, is that of Sihanouk himself. It numbers only about 5,000 troops and is therefore less significant than the KPNLF.

Sihanouk is also by now a less effective leader than the leader of the KPNLF. This is Son Sann, a frail, modest 73-year-old former prime minister of Cambodia, who left the country in the 1960s because of his disagreements with the prince. Until the late '70s, Son Sann remained in exile in Paris. When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. They approached him to lead their puppet regime. Instead he began to try to construct his KPNLF out of the refugees who had fled to the Thai border. By the end of 1984, Son Sann had a force of about 20,000.

Son Sann, consistent and courteous, is an unlikely guerrilla leader. He maintains that U.S. officials promised him military assistance if he formed the coalition with the Khmer Rouge. If so, that promise has not been fulfilled.

The Chinese, Vietnam's principal enemy, have been generous with arms shipments to their Khmer Rouge ally and niggardly with the KPNLF and Sihanouk. So when the recent massive Vietnamese attacks, KPNLF forces were routed quickly from their settlements. They may have moral support from much of the outside world, but they do not have the means to defend themselves.

The Vietnamese have been at such pains to destroy the KPNLF bases and infrastructure precisely because of the KPNLF's political successes at home and abroad. After the first KPNLF camp was destroyed in November, the Heng Samrin regime's minister of defense sent a message of congratulations to the troops involved. He said they had "to a large extent succeeded in blocking enemy infiltration into the interior."

The Vietnamese have captured many KPNLF infiltrators. Indeed most political prisoners inside Cambodia are associated with the KPNLF. Captured Khmer Rouge prisoners, as strayed communist comrades, are treated remarkably leniently by the Vietnamese—one month's reeducation is standard. It is the KPNLF people who are tortured and killed.

Vietnam's other consideration is to destroy the credibility of the KPNLF internationally. The increasing political success of the KPNLF has been an important factor in enabling Western governments and the Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations to support the coalition in which the Khmer Rouge are the dominant military partners.

Whether the KPNLF will be able to grow must depend on the level of support it gets from the outside. Son Sann has appealed for more help from the United States—not large-scale military assistance as was given by Washington in the early 1970s with disastrous consequences to the right-wing regime in Cambodia, but for enough material so that his forces can better resist Vietnamese fire power. In recent days, KPNLF

leaders have also said they may abandon their fixed bases along the Thai border in favor of guerrilla infiltration of Cambodia—just what the Vietnamese are trying to prevent.

Whether pressure from the front and the Khmer Rouge (whose camps have yet to be hit in the current offensive) will ever be enough to force the Vietnamese to a compromise is not clear. Vietnam has said that it will leave Cambodia only when "the threat from China" is lifted. That "threat" has been variously described as aid to the Khmer Rouge, assistance to resistance groups in Laos and military pressure along Vietnam's northern border with China.

Until and unless there is some sort of rapprochement between the Soviet Union, Vietnam's principal ally, and China, that seems unlikely to happen. For China, the present stalemate has obvious benefits. As for the Reagan Administration, it has been content to follow the Chinese line. All governments, including their own, have misused Cambodians for years now. There is no reason to suppose that this is about to change. But it is an issue which should remain at the forefront of the Vietnamese 10th anniversary celebrations.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1985.]

**VIETNAMESE FORCES ATTACK LAST RESISTANCE STRONGHOLD IN CAMBODIA**

(By William Branigin)

BANGKOK, March 5.—Vietnamese forces in Cambodia today turned their guns on the last resistance base still intact on the Cambodian side of the border with Thailand, attacking guerrillas loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk at a northern stronghold opposite the Thai village of Tatum, resistance and Thai military sources said.

The Thai military reported later that about 800 Vietnamese soldiers had crossed the border in the area of the fighting. Thai troops backed by artillery were battling to dislodge the intruders from three hills in Thai territory, the military said. No other details or confirmation were immediately available.

He said guerrilla defenders inflicted "quite heavy casualties" on the Vietnamese, who had not yet penetrated the camp's "first line of defense," about seven miles from its headquarters. Mealy said fighting also was going on farther inside Cambodia, about 17 miles from the Green Hill camp, and that guerrillas had found the bodies of some Vietnamese soldiers and taken their weapons.

Thai military sources confirmed that the Vietnamese had begun a long awaited operation against the camp but said they had no details of the fighting. No estimates of casualties on either side were available.

The Thai military charged that Vietnamese artillery shells landed in Thailand's Surin Province when gunners overshot the Green Hill camp.

Vietnamese shelling was also reported on Cambodia's western border with Thailand, north of the Thai town of Aranyaprathet. Refugees from Cambodian resistance settlements overrun earlier in the current Vietnamese offensive were forced to flee two evacuation sites and move farther into Thailand, according to reports from the border.

Since the Vietnamese began their offensive in November, they have overrun or forced the evacuation of all major border camps of the communist Khmer Rouge and the anticommunist Khmer People's National Liberation Front, the two largest factions in a three-party coalition of Cambodian resistance groups fighting the six-year-old Vi-

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etnamese occupation of their country. Sihanouk, 63, is president of the coalition.

Until now, the smallest faction, the Arme National Sihanoukiste, loyal to the former Cambodian monarch, had been spared in the offensive. In a recent interview, Sihanouk said the Vietnamese either planned not to attack his forces in an effort to sow suspicions of a "secret deal" between him and Hanoi, or were merely saving his camp for "dessert" in their current campaign.

In launching a drive against the Sihanouk faction, which claims 10,000 fighters but poses no serious military threat to the Vietnamese, Hanoi's forces apparently hope to deny the resistance coalition any last claim to a "liberated zone" on Cambodian soil.

Since November, the Vietnamese have forced practically the entire 250,000 Cambodian population of this zone along the border to flee into Thailand. Those evacuated include about 32,000 civilians who fled Green Hill and nearby camps during Vietnamese attacks in April 1984 and gathered at a site called Camp David, about nine miles north of the border.

Currently, according to western relief officials and resistance sources, there are no civilians left in the Green Hill camp. Sihanouk has said the camp is defended by about 5,000 of his fighters, with the rest of his guerrilla force operating inside Cambodia.

Sihanouk is scheduled to return to Bangkok later this week from a tour of Australia and New Zealand, then fly to Canton, China. Sihanouk, whose uneasy coalition government is recognized by the United Nations, has called on Chinese leaders to relieve Vietnamese pressure on the resistance by teaching Hanoi a "second lesson," reminiscent of the 1979 Chinese invasion of several northern Vietnamese provinces.

Mealy said the "defense ministers" of the three resistance factions agreed in a meeting Sunday that Khmer Rouge and Khmer People's National Liberation Front guerrillas would aid the Sihanoukists if their Green Hill camp were attacked.

The attack came as Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden was preparing to visit Hanoi to seek a solution to the Cambodian conflict.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS IN KAMPUCHEA: PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

December 1984

(Prepared by the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights)

#### PREFACE

This interim report is based on a human rights fact-finding mission to Kampuchea<sup>1</sup> by the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights. The mission, which took place from October 30 until November 14, 1984, was the first human rights fact-finding trip to that country in at least the past fifteen years. The delegation was led by Floyd Abrams, a partner in the New York law firm Cahill Gordon & Reindel who is a constitutional law expert and leading first amendment attorney. He was joined by Diane Orentlicher, deputy director of Law-

yers Committee, and Stephen Heder, an academic expert on Kampuchea.

The investigation focused on practices both in the interior of Kampuchea, in areas administered by the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which is led by Heng Samrin and supported by Vietnam, and in border regions administered by the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).

Despite repeated requests by the Lawyers Committee to the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea over a period of several months, the group was not granted permission to visit Phnom Penh and other areas under its control. Accordingly the delegation's investigation of practices in the PRK is based primarily on interviews with persons who recently fled from the interior to border regions which the delegates were allowed to visit.

The delegates were granted extensive access to areas controlled by the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the larger of the two non-communist parties to the CGDK. For reasons of time and logistics, the group did not seek permission to visit areas administered by the other non-communist party to the coalition, which is led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Mr. Abrams and Ms. Orentlicher were permitted to visit Malai-Makhoeun, an area controlled by Democratic Kampuchea (DK), which governed Kampuchea under the leadership of Pol Pot from 1975 until 1979. Mr. Heder was denied permission to visit this area. While in Malai-Makhoeun the two delegates met twice with Ieng Sary, who served as Foreign Minister under Pol Pot, and several other DK leaders. The delegation's conclusions about current conditions in DK areas are based on interviews with persons who recently fled its control, as well as information gathered during the visit of Mr. Abrams and Ms. Orentlicher to Malai-Makhoeun.

In addition to Kampuchean living in border regions, the delegates met with Kampuchean who had left the border areas and taken refuge in the holding center in Khao I Dang, Thailand, administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. They also met with relief workers on the border who have daily contact with Kampuchean living near the border: officials of private and international organizations involved in the relief effort based in Bangkok; United States officials, including the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, John Gunther Dean; journalists and others in a position to provide background information.

The overview they provided could not, of course, compensate for the gaps left by the delegates' inability to visit the PRK, and other limitations on their inquiry. Accordingly, the information they obtained is not comprehensive, even on the issue of current human rights conditions in Kampuchea. Nevertheless, a clear pattern of violations emerged from the individual testimonies that the mission judged to be reliable. Those patterns are the subject of this interim report.

A more complete report on the delegation's visit will be published by the Lawyers Committee in early 1985.<sup>2</sup>

#### INTRODUCTION

Six years after the Vietnamese invasion precipitated the collapse of Pol Pot's regime, an era of retrospection over its exceptional brutality appears, most belatedly, to have begun. A serious film and a number

of book-length accounts by journalists and academics have recently appeared or will soon be released, each attempting to deepen our awareness and understanding of the savage and tragic events that took place in that period. What occurred then involved mass murder on a scale rarely encountered in the history of mankind. To refer to those acts as "human rights" violations suggests anew the limitations of our language to describe the undescribable.

Violations of the nearly unprecedented scale and gravity of those committed in the mid-70's demand a full historical and legal accounting.<sup>3</sup> But in undertaking this investigation, our purpose was to examine the human rights of Kampuchean today, a subject that also deserves our attention.

The undertaking required us to overcome a pervasive reluctance within the international community to scrutinize current human rights problems in Kampuchea, problems that pale before the overwhelming brutalities of Pol Pot's rule but which are nonetheless all too real. The reticence is understandable, but at some point must stop holding away. The breadth of the violations that occurred under the DK regime justifies neither ignoring current realities nor concluding that nothing better or be hoped for Kampuchean.

#### CONDITIONS IN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

The rule of law is not respected in any serious sense in the People's Republic of Kampuchea. For the hundreds or perhaps thousands of political prisoners who inhabit its jails, beatings are commonplace and more sophisticated forms of torture usual. Their rights suffer from the virtually complete absence of a functioning legal process. Persons suspected of supporting resistance activity are typically arrested without charges being made, imprisoned without being sentenced or convicted, and kept in jail for indeterminate periods.

#### Physical integrity

Persons detained on suspicion of supporting resistance activities are routinely tortured in the early weeks of their detention.<sup>4</sup> During interrogation sessions, denials of the interrogator's charges are simply not accepted. Instead, confessions are forced from recalcitrant prisoners.<sup>5</sup> One prisoner described an interrogation session in the following terms:

"When I arrived [at the prison in Battambang City] they asked me whether it was true or not that I was a Sereikar [i.e., non-communist resistance] agent . . . And when . . . I said I was not a Sereikar agent, they beat me and used electric wire on me as well and I have marks in three places. I was beaten with a truncheon and a metal pipe which they had cut down to a length of about one meter so that it was easy to use, and they covered my head with a plastic bag of the type used here for containing rice. At that time, because I couldn't stand the pain, I let myself confess that I really was a Sereikar agent."

<sup>1</sup> The Cambodia Documentation Commission is under the supervision of David Hawk, working toward such an accounting.

<sup>2</sup> While most—but not all—of the prisoners we interviewed admitted to some form of resistance activity, all were accused of it in the course of interrogation. We met no prisoner accused of a common crime. A recent defector from the Phnom Penh police force told us that such prisoners are also tortured.

<sup>3</sup> The prisoner testimony we received indicated that confessions served to avert harsh treatment during interrogation, but not to mitigate the length of detention.

<sup>4</sup> The final report will address human rights conditions in areas administered by the PRK, the DK and the KPNLF, respectively.

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Beatings—with truncheons, metal pipes or rifle stocks—appear to be the most common form of torture. Several prisoners described how they were beaten while suspended from the ceiling, their arms trussed up behind their back. As the above-quoted testimony indicates, beatings are often supplemented with other forms of torture: electric shock; the "plastic bag" treatment; blowing lie powder in the prisoners' faces and tightening metal contraptions around their heads.

The beatings are often brutal. One former prisoner described his interrogator's response when he refused to indicate who was involved with him in resistance activities:

"While I was still stubbornly refusing to talk about my faction, this guy who had his foot up on the table kicked me right in the side, and I fell off the chair. And then he picked up the electric cable and whipped me on the back. And then he had me sit back up again, and then he said to me, 'I'm only going to ask you one more time, who's in this with you?' But I remained stubborn and wouldn't answer. And then he stomped on my instep with the boot, ripping open a wound, and I still have a scar. And he ripped off my shirt and then grabbed me by my chest hairs and pulled them out with such force that I was lifted up out of the chair, and I began to bleed . . . ."

In this and other cases, the delegates observed scars that backed up claims of torture.

Although we received few reports of prisoners dying as a result of torture, we heard many accounts of prisoners dying from malnutrition or untreated diseases. One prisoner held for 26 months at the Kandal provincial jail claimed that three prisoners had died of disease in that period, three more by hanging themselves, and two from beatings administered during interrogation. Other former prisoners routinely reported deaths in detention due to hunger or illness.

*Arrest and detention*

Among recently-released prisoners from various regions of the interior whom the delegates interviewed, strikingly consistent pattern of arbitrary arrest, interrogation and detention emerged. Persons were taken into custody without warrant, formal charges, or any other form of legal process. At no time were they brought before a judge or other judicial authority. Indeed, the concepts had no meaning to the former prisoners who were interviewed. They were interrogated at some point within the first weeks of their detention, and the process of interrogation was typically repeated several times in the ensuing weeks or months.

Sentencing as such is rare in the PRK, at least with respect to political prisoners. The typical political prisoner begins detention with no idea how long it will last, and is enlightened on this point only by his actual release, often several years later.

Convictions by a judicial organ appear to be a rarity, afforded to only a select minority of prisoners in the interior. Although the PRK has established People's Revolutionary Tribunals to try cases, only one of the former prisoners interviewed by the delegation had been sentenced by such a tribunal. He was not present during the proceeding; he was advised of it afterward, but even he was not told how long his sentence would be.

A number of former prisoners, civil servants and police from the PRK were, however, aware of several public tribunal proceedings in important political cases in which sentences were broadcast by the government. Recent defectors from the Phnom Penh police force were also aware of secret tribunal proceedings in which lengthy prison sentences or executions were ordered

in common criminal cases of a serious nature.

*Prison conditions*

During the early stages of detention, prisoners are frequently kept in foot shackles at all times when they are not actually being interrogated. One former prisoner described this condition in the following terms: "The shackles were attached to a cement platform about 300 centimeters high. My feet were placed through them and I sat on the ground with each foot held in shackles. There were ten of us shackled in there in two rows facing one another."

Another common experience during this period is being held in a "dungeon." These unlit, windowless cells typically form one section of a prison. In some, the "dungeon" is also "shackle cell." A prisoner held in "T-3," a prison in Phnom Penh, described his experience in the dungeon there:

"The [Vietnamese] led me into a dungeon which was about a meter and a half wide and two meters long. And at that point they put iron shackles on my feet, leaving my feet dangling off a platform. . . . They put me in with [another prisoner] and just left me there. . . . [T]his cell was No. 10, building A-3. . . ."

After several months of detention in these cells, prisoners are usually transferred to "daylight" cells in the same prison to serve the bulk of their sentences; some are transferred to lighted cells in another detention facility apparently designed to hold long-term detainees.

For some, the only indication of their impending release is yet another, final transfer to a "correction" facility. One, known as Trapeang Phlong or "T-5," is located in the district of Ponhea Kraek, Kampong Cham Province, about 7 kilometers from the Vietnamese border, and is directly administered by the Ministry of the Interior.<sup>7</sup> Another correction facility, "T-4," reportedly exists at Prey Sa on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, and is administered by the Phnom Penh police.<sup>8</sup> Prisoners who spend time in such facilities engage in labor and undergo political instruction.<sup>9</sup>

*Responsible authorities*

A variety of administrative and military units in the PRK appear to be empowered to detain suspected offenders. Most prominent in the civilian sphere are the uniformed police, known in Khmer as the *norokbal*, which operate under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry apparently also operates a separate network of plainclothes police whose agents have au-

<sup>7</sup> Another former prisoner described his introduction to the dungeon at T-3 in strikingly similar terms:

"They handed me a set of foot shackles and led me off to the Ministry of the Interior section of T-31. And then they took me into a dark room known as A-6 which was really quite dark and it was maybe a meter and a half wide and there were two persons lying there; another guy and me. Immediately upon my arrival they unlocked the shackles and put me in them."

<sup>8</sup> T-5 is reportedly guarded by Vietnamese as well as Kampuchean.

<sup>9</sup> One prisoner described a brief period of detention at a place designated as a "correction facility" in S'ang, a district in Kandal Province, which he said was administered by Vietnamese. But unlike other accounts of correction facilities, this person's time in S'ang was not his final phase of detention.

<sup>10</sup> A prisoner held at the Bakan district prison in Posat Province also described political instruction, though he did not describe the facility as a correction center.

"We studied politics . . . [T]hey taught us that if we wanted to go West to the soil where the *para* (non-communist resistance forces) were there wouldn't be anything there for us to eat. They said if you go West you'll see that these *paras* are just the same as Pol Pot . . . .

thority to arrest suspects, particularly political suspects. Several military units also take suspects into custody; these appear to be particularly active in the countryside.

A substantial number of ranking administrative posts in the Ministry of Interior, the *norkbal* and the plainclothes police are apparently held by Kampuchean who have spent much of their adult lives in Vietnam, and former cadres of Democratic Kampuchea's East Zone who sought refuge in Vietnam in 1978 to avoid being purged. Their duties and those of their subordinates are carried out with the close participation or supervision of "Vietnamese experts" (*chamneakar*). It appears that, at least Phnom Penh, Vietnamese security units sometimes take political suspects into custody on their own authority before turning them over to PRK administration. In the detention cases presented to us, Vietnamese personnel were often involved in the interrogation process as well, either directly or as observers.<sup>10</sup>

A striking indication of Vietnamese involvement is the designation of several prisons by the letter "T," followed by a number. When we asked prisoners what the "T" stood for, none knew. We later learned that it stood for "trai," a conventional Vietnamese communist party term for "(prison) camp."

*"Going West"*

We note that many of the recent arrivals from the interior left for reasons other than experiences of political persecution. Some had left because of quiet dissatisfaction with what they considered Vietnamese domination of Kampuchea or the political program of the PRK. Others left to escape military conscription or corvee-type labor. Perhaps the largest number had come to the border for primarily economic reasons: because of food shortages or to engage in trade. Still others came in search of relatives.

But if their reason for leaving did not entail political persecution, the act of leaving often did. Movement through the PRK is controlled by a pass system, and persons who are taken into custody because they lack the proper passes and are going westward—in the direction of non-PRK zones—are often presumed to be at least supporters of anti-PRK or anti-Vietnamese activities. Ordinary citizens apprehended in their journey west are generally detained briefly, and then sent home. Indeed, the only prisoner testimony we received in which torture was not mentioned involved such cases. Persons with governmental or military postings and others who for one reason or another are thought to support resistance activity are likely to undergo the experiences of arrest, interrogation, torture and detention described earlier.

With a recent escalation of military activities in Kampuchea, pass system controls seem to have tightened. Several recently released prisoners indicated that a substantial portion of the prison population consisted of persons apprehended whistled "going West."

<sup>10</sup> Thus, for example, one prisoner who was first arrested in April 1981 was interrogated in Prey Veng, the capital of the province of the same name, by a "Vietnamese expert" known as Deuk. During one interrogation session with Deuk, no Khmer were allowed to be present. The same prisoner was again arrested in Phnom Penh in January 1984. His arresting team included six "Vietnamese experts" from "7708," which he described as a sort of Vietnamese special branch unit in Phnom Penh. He was interrogated by a 7708 "expert" named Long.

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## CONDITIONS IN DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

To much of the world the word "Cambodia" evokes a single image: the mass, senseless murders of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge. Though in control of the nation only three and one-half years, they left a deep and lasting scar on the world conscience. Serious estimates of the death toll range from one to two million; by any count, the brutalities represent a horrifying almost incomprehensible chapter in modern history.

Routed by the Vietnamese of 1979, the government of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), as the Khmer Rouge regime officially known, no longer controls the country. In 1979 its leaders retreated to regions near the Thai border, which now serve as the rear base of military activities against the Vietnam-backed government in Phnom Penh. These areas are also home to what is estimated to be several hundred thousand civilians, whom the DK authorities govern as residents of "liberated zones."

Today, in the areas we investigated, it would appear that the murderous practices of the mid-1970's are no longer the order of the day. But severely restrictive controls over daily life remain a pervasive reality of DK society, and allegations of occasional instances of brutality and deaths during detention persist.

## Punishable offenses

Activities as personal as marriage and as simple as moving from one village to another are the subject of state control. Restrictions on these acts are enforced by terms of detention. Prisons in Democratic Kampuchea, which the authorities call "instruction halls,"<sup>11</sup> are filled with hundreds of persons who violated such taboos as taking photographs or trading with the Thais.

The control extends to speech as well. According to one person who recently fled an area of DK control, offenses include "speaking out in any way that adversely affects the government" \* \* \* for example, people who say that Socialism will be made again.<sup>12</sup> He asserted that it is a serious offense to "attack the leadership" by saying that "things are being done the way Pol Pot used to do things."<sup>13</sup>

Ieng Sary described several instances in which persons had been jailed for making disparaging comments about the war effort against the Vietnamese. He said that it is a political offense to say things like "the [Vietnamese] are attacking no one and we won't be able to defeat them," or that "there's no point in dying in the fight be-

<sup>11</sup> One recent defector described the political instruction in DK prisons as follows:

"There is political study in both [prisons] 80 and 81. A section of the Military Police goes in to give political instruction. The instruction consists of specific instructions like not to listen to the radio or have contact with foreigners, and things like that. More generally, the instruction consists of raising the problems of the prisoners' shortcomings. They also talk about the Resolution not to make Socialism or Communism again. And they say that 'those past events' and the loss of life that occurred during them didn't come about because of Ta Pol Pot, but because of persons infiltrated [by the Vietnamese]. They say that Ta Ti Muoy [literally 'grandfather number one'] this term of respect refers to Pol Pot. He is a good leader and a good man. They even give warnings that they will take into custody anyone who blames Pol Pot for what happened, because, they say, all of us are Khmers, and we should not blame one another."

<sup>12</sup> This refers to repeated declarations by the DK leadership that it will never revert to its past policies of "Socialism" and "Communism."

<sup>13</sup> We also learned of one person who had been detained for "doing agitation in the ranks of the army" because he said that in another sector "things were freer, more liberal, while in Sector 32 things were being done Communist style."

cause there's no way we'll ever win, that it's [KPNLF leader] Son Sann who is going to win \* \* \*"

Another significant area of control involves contact with outsiders. One recent defector told us that it is a crime in the DK area he fled to "make contact with the Thai or with humanitarian organizations to talk about work matters, especially if the conversation is considered to have political implications." Other defectors made similar statements. Even such indirect contact as listening to the radio broadcasts of the non-communist parties to the CGDK are proscribed.

Efforts to make contact with the Thai for purposes of trade appear to account for a significant portion of the prison population in DK zones about which we obtained information. Crossing the Thai border in order to leave DK control permanently is apparently regarded as a more serious offense.

Shortly before our visit, a group of 582 persons managed to escape Sector 32, and now live in a KPNLF camp at Samla. Fifty-eight people who attempted to flee with them were captured by DK authorities; some, but not all, of this group were reportedly detained for attempting to flee.<sup>14</sup>

During our visit to Malai-Makhoeun, we raised with Ieng Sary the matter of the 58 who were prevented from leaving. He promised to make an inquiry into their status, and to "do his best" to obtain permission from the "Battlefield Committee" with jurisdiction over them for them to join their families in Samla.

More generally, he denied that people are prevented from leaving or jailed for doing so. Acknowledging that persons caught trying to flee have been jailed, he said that they were detained for "political offenses" committed before leaving.

Against this background, we regard as a significant step the DK authorities' willingness to allow a human rights delegation to visit villages. Such acceptance of international scrutiny of human rights conditions would be welcome in any context; it seems a particularly significant gesture on the part of an authority that has placed strict controls on contacts between those it governs and the rest of the world. Our gratitude must be tempered, however, by the DK leaders' refusal to admit the entire delegation.

## Physical security

While it is widely agreed by defectors that deliberate killing and torture are no longer common in the DK zones we investigated, it is frequently reported that some prisoners are sent to work in areas where mines pose a threat to life. Sources differ on the degree of intent involved, but tend to agree on the basic facts. Thus, one person held in a prison for minor offenders in Sector 32, a region under DK control, told us:

"While I was there, some of the prisoners who went out to work stepped on mines. Six stepped on mines, and three were killed and the three others were wounded. I don't know whether the guards intentionally had these six step on mines or not."

Another person held in the Sector 32 prison for minor offenders alleged that "prisoners who are hated are killed by putting a mine somewhere and then forcing the prisoners to work where the mine has been put. They do it this way so that no one can say that people are beaten to death and thrown out as garbage, like they were in Pol Pot times. This is done only to prisoners

<sup>14</sup> One week after the large group fled, a smaller group of some 60 people made an unsuccessful attempt to leave.

who are hated by the cadres, by the guards."

It seems clear that prisoners have been killed by mines in these areas where they were sent to work. When we presented these reports to Ieng Sary, he did not dispute this, but claimed that the deadly mines had been swept into areas where prisoners worked by a series of floods in the past year.

Perhaps the most that can be said about this practice is the view of one recent defector from Sector 32:

"I can't figure out whether they take prisoners out to work in areas where there are mines because they intend to kill them or just because of negligence. It's clear, however, that they know there are mines there and don't care."

The infrequency of such reported incidents suggests that state-sponsored killing is no longer the most important form of social control in the DK areas we investigated. In those areas there appears, in fact, to be a policy of restraint with respect to violations of physical security.<sup>15</sup>

Though we heard some reports of beatings during interrogation in one DK prison,<sup>16</sup> we were more often told that this does not take place. A knowledgeable recent defector from DK control told us that he had never heard of any beatings or any use of electric shock or use of plastic bags, that sort of thing. They don't do things like this because it would be politically counter-productive. According to what I understand, there are orders from above, circulars, prohibiting the use of torture.

Another source indicated that threats are employed during interrogation, even though torture may be rare.

It may well be that such threats, amplified by the implicit threat that memory cannot fail to supply, are sufficient to maintain the desired level of control. As one recent defector put it, "the only manifestation of opposition there has ever been is our escape."

The Lawyers Committee on International Human Rights is a public interest law center that promotes compliance with internationally recognized human rights law and legal principles. It was founded in 1975. Its Chairman is former federal judge Marvin E. Frankel, its Executive Director is Michael H. Posner and its Deputy Director is Diane F. Orentlicher.●

## TRIBUTE TO RAOUL WALLENBERG

● Mr. SARBAKES. Mr. President, more than 40 years have passed since the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, the extraordinary young Swede

<sup>15</sup> These observations are limited to border areas under DK control that we investigated, and not to practices of DK soldiers fighting in the interior. Because we were unable to visit the interior, we could not investigate reports that DK soldiers have attacked civilians there in the past year.

<sup>16</sup> A person who had been detained at the Sector 32 prison for minor offenders ("Ta Seum's place") told us of reported abuses at the Sector 32 prison for major offenses ("Ta Chan's place").

"There is said to be mistreatment at Ta Chan's place. For example, if, upon first arrival, you can't dig out the really big tree stump they want you to dig out, they don't give you your food ration. Only when you finally get it out will you be fed. Also, at first there are said to be some beatings during interrogation, beatings aimed at getting you to tell them who it was that convinced you to run away. Sometimes, they say, the beatings lead to death. A friend of mine who was held there told me this. I also heard that there were others, but I don't know any other names. At Ta Seum's place, no one was ever beaten to death, or even beaten at all."

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in 1983 and 9.8 billion square yards last year. This level of imports penetration is equivalent to the loss of 1 million American jobs.

The Reagan administration has been unable to address this trade problem. In his 1980 campaign for President, Ronald Reagan noted the importance of the textile/apparel industry and promised to relate import growth to domestic market growth. This pledge was reaffirmed by Chief of Staff James Baker in a December 1981 letter concerning the approaching negotiations for the renewal of the MFA. Again in October 1982, the President affirmed that promise and maintained that the just completed MFA negotiations would limit the growth of textile/apparel imports to a level well below the rate of growth in the domestic market.

The actual record has been completely different; imports have continued to increase at a rate greatly in excess of domestic market growth. The President's commitments go unfulfilled and the erosion of American manufacturing jobs continues.

This legislation will enable the President to keep his promise. It addresses the problem simply by enforcing existing agreements under the MFA to limit import growth of textiles, apparel, textile products and man-made fibers to the level contemplated in the 1981 MFA agreements.

In 1985, imports from the major exporting nations—those with more than 1.25 percent of the U.S. market—will be limited to the approximate 6 percent growth levels provided for in the MFA. In future years, imports from these countries will be allowed to increase 1 percent.

In 1985, imports from the smaller exporting countries—those with less than 1.25 percent of the U.S. market—will be allowed to grow 15 percent above the 1984 level. In future years import growth from those nations will be limited to 6 percent.

There are those who will say that this is unreasonable, trade restrictive legislation that will violate our international treaty obligations. But the textile and apparel industry already operates under an existing, GATT consistent, regimen of trade restrictions. All this legislation would do is enforce existing agreements; agreements which other MFA signatory nations currently enforce to limit the growth of textile and apparel imports.

We can no longer stand by while existing trade laws are circumvented; while imports flood into the United States, factories close, and our workers are sent to the unemployment lines.

The major textile and apparel producing nations operate today under a system of import controls. Other nations have enforced their laws giving effect to MFA negotiated agreement; they maintain their domestic industries in accordance with established rules of international trade. We owe

no less to our workers in the textile and apparel industries.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to add the distinguished Senator from Alaska to this bill who is now presiding over the Senate, Mr. MURKOWSKI. We are very pleased to have him join on this bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished minority leader is recognized.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, it is my understanding that my time under the standing order has been reserved.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair for his patience.

## AFGANISTAN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, two articles appearing in the Washington Post recently provided insights into the situation in Afghanistan. The Washington Post of Sunday, March 17, chronicles the seige of a Communist garrison in the town of Barikot, near the Afghan-Pakistani border. This is yet another example of the Soviet-backed effort to subjugate the people of Afghanistan by controlling small garrisoned towns that serve as fortress islands in a sea of Afghan freedom fighters. This strategy has doomed the Soviet occupation army to 5 years of humiliation and indecisive warfare which has left Afghan resistance forces in control of two-thirds of the country.

The report from Barikot followed a March 16 article describing the recent meeting between Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq and the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. The Post reports that the Soviet leader took that occasion to warn the Pakistani President that support for the Afghan resistance was regarded as support for aggression against a Soviet ally, Afghanistan. Gorbachev's meeting with President Zia and the Soviet press followup were unusually harsh. The only bright spot came in President Zia's observation that "both sides seem to be aware that the problem does not admit of a military solution." If the Soviets indeed have come to this realization, it would be reason for hope.

But there was a dangerous and seriously counterproductive theme that was reported in connection with the meeting. The Soviet leader seems to have made an explicit link between Afghanistan and Soviet policy toward Nicaragua.

The Soviet leadership should be under no illusions that the United States accepts such a linkage. Moreover, they should understand that the Congress will not countenance that

linkage. Soviet frustration over the military stalemate in Afghanistan has the Soviet leadership groping for leverage in other areas of foreign policy. They will find none. The Soviet Union must decide to negotiate in earnest with a view toward complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. No other mix of issues will produce stability and certainty for Soviet policy in that region.

I ask unanimous consent that two articles entitled "Gorbachev Warns on Afghan Aid" from the Washington Post of March 16 and "Afghan Town Under Siege" from the Washington Post of March 17 be reprinted in full at the close of my remarks.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1985]

## GORBACHEV WARNS ON AFGHAN AID

LINK BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND U.S. PRESSURE ON NICARAGUA INTENDED  
(By Dusko Doder)

Moscow, March 15.—The new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has issued Moscow's sternest warning to date to Pakistan for its support of Afghan rebels, and well-informed circles here reported today that the Kremlin was considering unspecified actions against Pakistan if President Reagan continues his military pressure on Nicaragua.

Signals that Moscow considers linking the question of Nicaragua to Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan appeared designed to give a new twist to both problems. It was not clear whether these signals hold any prospects of possible trade-offs, although they suggest that the new Soviet leader seems determined to seek a solution of the Afghan issue.

Gorbachev's warning came yesterday during his meeting with Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq and Foreign Minister Sabahzada Yaqub Khan, who were here for the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko.

A report on the meeting by the official news agency Tass included extraordinarily harsh language. It said the Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko gave the Pakistani leaders "a frank, principled assessment of the policy conducted" by Zia's government.

"Aggressive actions" against Afghanistan, a Soviet ally whose government is maintained by about 100,000 Soviet troops, are being carried out from Pakistan's territory, the Tass report continued. "It was also stressed that this cannot but affect in the most negative way Soviet-Pakistani relations."

The new Soviet leader appeared to be taking an entirely new and tougher approach toward the Afghanistan issue. Charges that Zia was supporting "aggression" against a Soviet ally and warnings of possible dire consequences of his actions have been voiced in the Soviet media on several occasions. However, Gorbachev took the unusual step of associating himself with these charges during his meeting with the Pakistani leader yesterday.

Sources here hinted today that the intensified pressure on Zia was linked not only to Moscow's growing frustration with the five-year-old military stalemate in Afghanistan but also to Reagan's increased pressure on the leftist government of Nicaragua.

According to the reports, the Russians are considering the possibility of encouraging anti-Zia elements in Pakistan, presumably

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by providing arms and other assistance to separatists in border areas such as Baluchistan.

The sources here suggested that an American military action against Nicaragua would provoke a serious effort to topple the Zia government.

On Wednesday, Gorbachev received Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, and Tass reported that they "vigorously condemned the U.S. policy of interference in Latin American affairs" and agreed on the need to "sharpen international efforts . . . for a just political settlement."

Diplomatic observers here noted that by linking the problem of Afghan insurgency to America's pressure on Nicaragua, the new leadership seemed to be signaling that it is capable of inflicting real damage on U.S. interests in an area close to Soviet borders.

Washington has longstanding ties with Pakistan dating from the CENTO alliance of the 1950s and is currently supplying Zia's government with advanced combat jets and other weapons under a \$3.2 billion aid package concluded after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

U.S. sources here said that for nearly a year there have been cross-border raids from Afghanistan into Pakistan as well as artillery shelling of Pakistani positions from Afghan territory.

There is little doubt that Gorbachev would like to find a way out of the Afghan impasse. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has complicated Moscow's relations with China, the Moslem countries and the West. The Afghan war is also becoming increasingly unpopular in the Soviet Union, although discontent is rarely voiced in public.

An earlier article in Pravda, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, included more explicit charges against Zia's regime and asserted that the CIA was maintaining a "number" of bases and camps in Pakistan to train and equip Moslem insurgents who are subsequently sent into Afghanistan.

Pravda also said that "American instructors" are training Zia's police forces to be "used in the restless North West Frontier Province of Pakistan." This border province, which has become a logistical base for the Afghan rebels, includes an area where ethnic separatists, traditionally supported by successive governments in Kabul, have sought to establish an independent state called Pushtunistan.

Pravda also charged that all weapons destined for use by the Afghan rebels are passing through the Pakistani port of Karachi.

The Gorbachev-Zia meeting appears to have brought Soviet-Pakistani relations to a new low.

Zia was here for the third time in less than 2½ years. In November 1982, when he attended Leonid Brezhnev's funeral, Zia was received by incoming leader Yuri Andropov, who gave him a warm welcome and sought to enlist his support for a political settlement on Afghanistan.

Andropov's proposal sought to end all insurgent activity from Pakistan's territory before diplomatic talks on an eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops. This initiative came to naught and the Afghan problem has remained stalemated diplomatically as well as militarily.

Zia came to Moscow again in February 1984 for the funeral of Andropov and remained in the city an extra day hoping to meet Chernenko. However, Zia was given a cold shoulder and left without seeing the new Soviet leader.

This time, Zia was among more than 25 foreign distance dignitaries received by Gorbachev. The new Soviet leader's words in his meeting with Zia, as summarized by Tass, stood in stark contrast to the overall conciliatory and friendly tone of Gorbachev's discussions with all other visiting politicians.

In Islamabad, Zia told a news conference that he held two "business-like" meetings with Gorbachev and that Afghanistan, "as expected, figured largely" in the talks, the Associated Press reported.

[Despite "obvious differences of perception," Zia said, . . . "both sides seem to be aware that the problem does not admit of a military solution.]

Gorbachev also met yesterday with Afghanistan's Communist president, Babrak Karmal, and they jointly condemned "continued aggressive actions by outside forces" against Afghanistan, according to Tass. The news agency provided no other details on the substance of the talks.

The Kremlin sent troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 to back up Babrak after the ouster of rival Communist Party leader Hafizullah Amin.

[From the Washington Post, March 17, 1985]

#### AFGHAN TOWN UNDER SIEGE REBEL FIRE BREAKS SILENCE

(By Anthony Davis)

**BARIKOT, AFGHANISTAN.**—Between dawn and dusk, Barikot is a ghost town.

Along the deserted streets of this garrison settlement on the Afghan-Pakistani border signs of habitation are visible—a row of Army trucks parked by an empty airstrip, laundry spread out to dry in a back yard, a few cows wandering untended. But for hours at a stretch no human movement is to be seen.

Sporadically, the eerie stillness hanging over a seemingly dead town is broken by a short burst of heavy machine-gun fire as Moslem guerrillas dug in on the ridges overlooking the settlement open up on a suspected target. Then the echoing gunfire dies away, and the silence of the mountains returns.

The guerrillas, or mujaheddin, have had Barikot and its Kabul government garrison encircled since September in a bid to capture the border town at the head of the Konar Valley. Barikot's land links with the capital have been cut for more than two years.

Today the siege shows few signs of reaching an early end, and it is becoming an increasingly volatile flash point on the troubled border. In recent months, Pakistan has lodged repeated charges of Afghan Air Force overflights of its territory and several incidents of bombing of the Pakistani town of Arandu, about a mile across the border from Barikot. Kabul has retorted with countercharges of stepped-up Pakistani support for the mujaheddin and of shelling of Barikot from Pakistan.

In comments to journalists in Peshawar Friday, Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq described the increase in violations of Pakistani airspace as "unhealthy," adding that Kabul should realize that there is a limit to Islamabad's tolerance.

[Zia, who was in Moscow for the funeral of Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko Wednesday, was issued a stern warning about Pakistan's support for the Afghan rebels by the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet news agency Tass reported Friday.]

During the winter months, Soviet and Afghan government troops have made a concerted effort to push up the Konar Valley—a perennial focus of anti-Kabul resistance—apparently with a view to both breaking the siege of Barikot and establishing strongholds along the valley that would hamper guerrilla infiltration and supply. With the coming of spring, the valley that

runs parallel to the Pakistani border is becoming one of several major supply conduits from Pakistan to the resistance across Afghanistan.

The winter offensive appears to have failed dismally. A large Communist force that began advancing from Jalalabad in mid-December succeeded in reaching Chaghcharai, the provincial capital of Konar, and later pushed on as far as the town of Asmar, meeting resistance at several points. But in February the advance stalled amid heavy fighting just beyond Asmar, about 25 miles short of Barikot.

In late February and early this month, posts established following the Communist advance were destroyed piecemeal by mujaheddin groups operating in the now largely depopulated valley.

"The situation is back much as it was at the beginning of winter," noted one western diplomat. The guerrillas have built well-camouflaged bunkers and gun emplacements on ridges dominating the town on both sides of the valley. Barikot is now wholly reliant on resupply from the air. But with the resistance fielding an impressive concentration of heavy machine guns on the heights, that is becoming an increasingly hazardous undertaking.

According to mujaheddin of the Peshawar-based National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, the last supply drop came more than one month ago as transport helicopters under heavy fire from the heights under heavy fire from the heights dumped food and ammunition without even touching. Despite covering fire from attack helicopters and bombing by jets, one transport was downed, crashing just clear of the air-strip.

With the failure to lift the siege by land last month, repeated attempts have been made in recent days to knock out mujaheddin bunkers on the mountaintops to facilitate the ferrying in of supplies by air. Predictably, the stepped-up air attacks have resulted in further charges from the Pakistani government of overflights and bombing of Arandu. For their part, the Kabul authorities contended late last month that hundreds of men had crossed the border to attack Barikot, one of a string of similar accusations dismissed by Islamabad as "fictitious."

Both sides' charges appear to have considerable justification, however. On Tuesday MiG23 jets supported by Mi24 and Mi8 helicopter gunships could be seen bombing and rocketing mujaheddin positions around Barikot, and, at the end of their attack runs, clearly overflying Pakistani territory.

Guerrillas later said that machine-gun fire from the helicopters had hit houses on the Pakistani side of a narrow mountain stream in the Arandu Valley that marks the border. But less easy to gauge was whether the overflights were deliberate or more or less inevitable, given that mujaheddin positions overlooking Barikot are about a half-mile from the border.

The following day, according to Islamabad, Afghan jets dropped 37 bombs on the Pakistani side of the border, and on Thursday another raid reportedly killed two persons near Arandu.

It is clear that under cover of darkness, large groups of guerrillas are moving through Arandu to cross the stream and reinforce positions around the Kabul government's beleaguered garrison.

"Some of our groups are fighting inside more or less permanently," said Mohammed Ayub, a commander from the Asmar area. "But many others will go in from the camps to fight for two or three months and then return to their families as other mujahed-

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din take over." With the snows melting fast, increasing numbers of fighters are now moving back into Afghanistan.

Around Barikot itself, the siege drags on at an almost medieval pace. Guerrillas while away the time sniping at an occasional Afghan Army soldier emerging from cover.

On one afternoon a group of guerrillas were observed around a new Chinese heavy machine gun. They were greatly amused as they terrified a man foolhardy enough to attempt to drive a stray cow back into a pen. Clearly visible through binoculars—and the machine gun's telescopic sights—the man finally lost his nerve and sprinted for cover as bullets peppered the ground around him. He escaped unscathed, but others have been less lucky.

For Barikot's population—a force of about 1,200 soldiers, 300 militia and 2,000 or 3,000 civilians—conditions are deteriorating. According to accounts from the besieged town reaching the guerrillas, food prices have spiraled, meat is now rarely available and morale is low. During the day, the population remains indoors, emerging after dark to go about normal business, including working in the fields within the defense perimeter. Any use of lights invariably attracts guerrilla fire.

Nor does the garrison exert itself much in its own defense. Outposts on the lower slopes keep attackers at a distance, but there are no attempts to venture beyond the town's defenses and try to dislodge the guerrillas from their positions on the heights.

On their side, the guerrillas display little determination to bring the siege to an end. Mirroring the situation around hundreds of Afghan Army and Soviet posts across Afghanistan, the resistance effectively has succeeded in bottling up Communist troops and gaining a tactical initiative. But lack of heavier weapons and, in many cases, of political direction results in an inability to exploit the advantage.

At Barikot, the guerrillas cite mines laid around Communist defenses as the main reason for the current standoff. But an element of lethargy is discernible, too. In contrast to aggressive assaults through mine fields witnessed last year in the Panjshir Valley, there is little evidence at Barikot of readiness to risk casualties in a concerted effort to seize the town.

But the underlying weakness of the resistance in the Konar Valley is its solidly tribal composition, which inhibits the establishment of a unified command and makes military coordination difficult. Around Barikot, at least five major Peshawar-based *mujahedin* parties are represented by different Pushtu tribal groups.

Pushtu tribal allegiances remain paramount and effectively preclude the emergence of the sort of regional commands that have proved highly effective in the ethnically Tajik and Uzbek provinces of northern Afghanistan, where society is not tribal.

"One tribe here would never accept the leadership of a man from another," noted one Peshawar-based analyst, himself from the Konar Valley, a bastion of Pushtu conservatism.

Such as it is, coordinated military decision-making around Barikot and Asmar is arrived at by means of a *jirga* or assembly of tribal leaders. The result is generally more talk than action. Even when it does occur, coordinated military action hinges mainly on intertribal competitiveness; no one tribe wishing to have its honor stained by appearing less warlike than its rivals.

Around Barikot at present, there is talk of a *jirga* to decide details of a final assault on the embattled and dispirited Communist enclave. But observers are not holding their breath waiting for the big push.

## WEST VIRGINIA: A PATRIOT'S STATE

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, at one point during the Revolutionary War when America's fortunes were at their lowest and most desperate ebb, George Washington declared:

Leave me but a banner to plant upon the mountains of Augusta, and I will rally around me the men who will lift our bleeding country from the dust, and set her free.

Augusta was the name by which West Virginia was known in those days. The fierce patriotism that Washington had discovered in those pioneer West Virginians was already an innate character—a trait that has proved itself again and again throughout our country's history.

Measured by population and geographic size, West Virginia is not one of our larger States. Yet, in conflict after conflict, the people of West Virginia have set records in responding to America's calls for defenders and in sacrificing their lives to keep our country free and secure.

During World War II, for example, West Virginia ranked fifth among the States in the percentage of its male population participating in the Armed Forces, second in the percentage of casualties, and fourth in the percentage of deaths.

In the Korean war, West Virginia was first in the percentage of male population participating, first in the percentage of casualties, and first in the percentage of deaths.

During the Vietnam era, West Virginia ranked second highest among the States in the percentage of male population participating and first in the percentage of deaths.

In fact, no other State has sent such a consistently high percentage of its young men to war. As in George Washington's lifetime, West Virginians have traditionally placed the defense of freedom above personal considerations and comfort.

I call attention to West Virginia's strong patriotic heritage—not to denigrate the patriotism of our sister States, but to define more clearly the meaning of patriotism itself.

In recent years, too often, jaded sophistication and cynicism have made light of patriotism and sometimes held the idea of sacrificing for the Nation's good up to mockery and satire. More deplorably, from time to time, newspaper and television reports surface of American citizens who have sold sensitive national defense secrets to foreign agents, and of commercial contractors who, as a matter of no apparent concern and common practice, have literally fleeced the Government out of astounding amounts of money on defense contracts or for consultation work.

Nations do not long survive and flourish where the citizens have no understanding of or love for their heritage. And no country can long remain free and strong where the pursuit of

selfish interest is the most valued and admired principle of the land.

That is why I call attention to and commend the sacrifices of West Virginia to our country's security. I am deeply proud to represent a State with such a tradition—a State whose citizens understand the words of Rudyard Kipling:

## THE HERITAGE

Our fathers in a wondrous age,  
Ere yet the earth was small,  
Ensured to us an heritage,  
And doubted not at all,  
That we, the children of their heart,  
Which then did beat so high,  
In later time should play like part for our posterity.

Then, fretful, murmur not they gave so great a charge to keep,  
Nor dream that awestruck time shall save  
Their labor while we sleep.  
Dear-bought and clear, a thousand year  
Our father's title runs.  
Make we likewise their sacrifice,  
Defrauding not our sons.

Mr. President, I yield any remaining time I may have to Mr. PROXMIRE.

## RECOGNITION OF SENATOR PROXMIRE

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAMM). Under the previous order, the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the Democratic leader.

## WILL OUR MILITARY POLICIES PROMOTE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, last January NBC News reported that special U.S. forces throughout Europe and this country have been training with a nuclear explosive that fits into a soldier's backpack. At 58 pounds it is heavy. It would take strong soldiers in good shape to carry it a few miles. But what a punch it delivers; each of those 58 pounds carry an explosive force equivalent to 10 tons of TNT! NBC estimated that each of these back packs would carry an explosion 250 times more powerful than the bomb that blew up the marine barracks in Beirut and killed more than 200 American service men. Obviously, this is quite an addition to the arsenal of any commando unit. NBC says that the Green Berets based in Germany are trained to use these "nukepacks" to destroy airports, dams and other vital targets behind enemy lines. The bomb is reported to have been part of the NATO arsenal and war plans since 1964. Now NBC reports, that not only have Green Beret units been trained in using these nuclear explosions, but units from Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Italy, and West Germany have learned how to use these tactical nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Navy Seal teams have undergone training in the under water

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use of these explosives in demolition exercises in Scotland, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Other training in the "nukepack" use has taken place in South Korea, Okinawa, and in several sites in this country.

Mr. President, the widespread dispersion of these small nuclear weapons into so many different countries suggests a far more likely scenario for the beginning of World War III, which would be the last war, than any pre-emptive strike from the Soviet Union. What would be the reaction of the Soviet Union if somewhere along the many miles of border between free Western Europe and Communist Eastern Europe, the Green Berets or an American trained commando team deployed and detonated some of these nuclear devices in response to a Soviet conventional attack? Would the Soviets stop at once, "Cry Uncle" and ask for terms of surrender? Or would they call our bluff and raise the ante with a nuclear strike of their own somewhere? Of course they might view this use of nuclear weapons against them as the sure beginning of the first all-out nuclear war, World War III, assume the advantage would lie with the country that instituted the first pre-emptive strike and let go with an all-out nuclear assault on every target they could reach in the United States. No one, possibly even the Soviet leaders themselves, knows for sure how they would react. But the consequence of the detonation of the mininuclear bomb as an act of war with its relatively little 10 tons of TNT punch could be the worst catastrophe in world history.

Mr. President, the NBC revelation of the very widespread training and deployment of these mininuclear weapons throughout so many parts of the world, tells us how very thin and tenuous is this superpower peace and how very likely it is that unless we find some way of controlling these backpack nukes, somewhere, sometime, someone will begin to use these devastating little weapons. In fact, William Arkin in his concluding comments on NBC News said this:

There is clearly a consensus within the U.S. military that these weapons have some military usefulness in wartime and, therefore, most likely would be used in any conflict.

If Arkin is right, the use of these small nuclear explosives might be no farther away than the first U.S. initiative in Central America that runs into difficulties. After all, this is where our commandos are most likely to have the first call for their services.

The NBC report was carried to millions of Americans in prime evening news time. The American people are now on notice about the prospect that our country may be ready at any minute to take the first small but infinitely dangerous step toward fullscale nuclear war. As Members of the Congress of the United States, we have a duty to ask: Is this "back-pack nuke"

policy worth the obvious and terrible risk it poses? What steps has this country taken to prevent the proliferation of this cheap, but powerful new instrument of military power from falling into the hands of Iran, Libya, Syria, and any number of other countries that have made a career out of terrorism?

Here is one little grabber that should get our attention. Consider: In 1987, on January 25, the President of the United States is scheduled to give his State of the Union Message to the Congress in the presence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice President, the President's Cabinet, the Supreme Court, and both Houses of Congress. In short, as usual, all the policymakers of our country will be gathered in one section of the Capitol building. At about 8 p.m., a little Volkswagen sporting a House of Representatives tag-fake, of course—is waved ahead by the guard as it drives up to park at the Capitol steps on the House side. A man steps out of the car. He carries a detonating device. He has concealed three nuke packs under some clothing in the back seat of the Volks. The man walks to the Metro subway, a few blocks away, travels 5 or 6 miles in any one of several directions on the subway.

At 9 o'clock, the President enters the House Chamber. At 9:05, he begins to talk. At 9:15, the Volkswagen driver, from his safe position 5 or 6 miles away, sets off the three nuke packs with their equivalent of 60,000 pounds—30 tons—of TNT. The Government of the United States is decapitated. It has totally disappeared.

Of course, back-pack nukes may be a certainty of the future no matter what we do, and they may be used against us. But there are precautions we can take and we should certainly insist on far more convincing public justification than we have had so far on the military "consensus" NBC has reported that they would "most likely be used in any conflict."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from the NBC News report I have quoted be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## EXCERPT

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1985.

TOM BROKAW. You could call it Nukepak. It is a nuclear weapon that fits more or less into a soldier's backpack. Each nukepak's force is roughly one-twelve-hundredth that of the bomb that crushed Hiroshima. On this program last week, we reported that American forces have one hundred nukepaks in West Germany alone; and, as Fred Francis reports tonight, some Germans find that upsetting.

FRED FRANCIS. The existence of backpack nuclear weapons surprised the West Germans. (German Commentator) It has become a point of debate, as NBC News reported last Thursday, that there are one hundred of the portable bombs on German soil. Opposition politicians are furious. Several newspapers charge the United States

with taking too free a hand in Germany's defense; and one paper claimed that Germans don't know what's going on in their own country.

The 58-pound bomb, called a special atomic demolition munition, has been part of NATO's war plans since 1964. The Green Berets based outside Batholtz are prepared to use the very low-yield nuclear bombs to destroy airports, dams, and other vital targets behind enemy lines. The bombs are detonated with a timing device.

The backpack weapon these men will carry is two hundred and fifty times more powerful than the bomb which blew up the Marine barracks in Beirut. The Green Berets outside Batholtz are not the only soldiers in Europe with this special nuclear expertise. NBC News has learned that units from Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Italy, and West Germany have been taught how to use the backpack explosives.

Military analyst William Arkin questions whether such weapons are really a deterrent.

WILLIAM ARKIN. Special atomic demolition munitions are the product of the 1950's when we were nuclearizing every component of our armed forces and even created nuclear landmines. They should be withdrawn from Europe.

FRANCIS. The backpack nuclear mission is not unique to Europe and the Green Berets. Navy Seal teams, who, among other things, practice underwater demolitions, have trained with the small nuclear charges. Those Navy Seal teams are based in Macrahanish, Scotland; Subic Bay, the Philippines; Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; and Little Creek, Virginia.

In addition to Batholtz, West Germany, the Army's nuclear teams are in Wee Jung Bu, South Korea; and Fort Devons, Massachusetts. The Marines, too, have nuclear ordnance platoons in Okinawa, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and 29 Palms, California.

In Europe, the weapons would also be used if Warsaw Pact troops overran NATO positions. Under one of NATO's operational plans, numbered 4304, the Green Berets are called Stay Behind Forces, who would destroy targets that might be useful to the enemy. Fred Francis, NBC News, the Pentagon.

FRANCIS. The opposing generals say the commandos' place should be where it has always been, preparing for the big war. That's the mission of Special Forces in Batholtz, West Germany. In a big war, they would drop behind Soviet lines and organize resistance movements.

The Special Forces are trained in European languages, customs, and in sabotage. Special Forces carry backpacks, identical to this one. It weighs about 58 pounds, and it's called a special, atomic demolition munition, SADEM, for short; or, in soldier's jargon, a back-pack nuke. There are one hundred of these back-pack nuclear weapons in West Germany.

The back-pack nukes would be set off by remote control to destroy targets such as airfields and Soviet command sites. Military analyst William Arkin uncovered the documents about the use of SADEMs in Europe.

WILLIAM ARKIN. There is clearly a consensus within the U.S. military that these weapons have some military usefulness in wartime and, therefore, most likely would be used in any conflict.